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Summary findings
In Peru,  as in many  other  developing  countries,  Results  based  on several  empirical  strategies  suggesL
employers  have  the legal  obligation  to compensate  that  workers  "pay"  for  their  entitlement  to  severance  pay
workers  who  are dismissed  through  no fault  of their  through  lower  wages.
own.  Is this  an efficient  mechanism  for  providing  income  Consumption  among  unemployed  workers  who
support  to the  unemployed?  receive  severance  pay is 20 to 30 percent  greater  than
Maclsaac  and  Rama  seek an  answer  to this question,  among  those  who  do not.  Consumption  among  these
using  individual  records  from  a household  survey  with  a  workers  is actually  higher  than  consumption  among
panel  structure.  Relying  on five coverage  indicators,  they  employed workers,  suggesting  that  mandatory  severance
show  that  roughly  one in five workers  in the  private  pay is overgenerous  in Peru.
sector,  and one  in three  wage earners  in the private
sector,  is legally  entitled  to severance  pay.  Coverage  is
more  prevalent  among  wealthier  workers.
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NW,  Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact  Hedy  Sladovich,  mail stop MC2-204,  telephone  202-473-7698,  fax 202-522-
1154,  email  address  hsladovich@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers  are also  posted  on  the Web  at htrp://
econ.worldbank.org.  Martin  Rama  may  be contacted  at mrama@aworldbank.org.  June  2001.  (38 pages)
The Policy  Research  Workiiig  Paper  SePres  dissemibates  the findings  of work in progress  to encourage  the excange or ideas  about
dev  elopnient  issuies.  Ail ob  jective  of  the series  is to  get the  findinigs  oiit  quiickly,  even  if the presentations  are  less  than1  fuflly  polished.  The
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Performance (P045656). Working papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are
published to elicit comments and to further debate.1.  Introduction
In Peru, like in many other developing countries, employers have the legal obligation to
compensate workers  who  are  dismissed due  to  no  fault  of  their  own.  The  amount of
compensation  to be paid is based on a formula involving seniority in the job and the last monthly
salary.  The specific formula has been modified several times over the last decade, but it has
often involved a minimum seniority, a maximum severance pay, and various discontinuities or
kinks.  Depending on seniority, the total amount received by the worker represents a few months
to one year of salary.  Compliance is complaint-driven, as a dismissed worker who is denied
severance pay can report the problem to the Ministry of Labor, and possibly get his or her due.
Handling these complaints is actually one of the main tasks of the Ministry.
Mandatory severance pay  of  this  sort  could be  seen  as  a  convenient substitute for
unemployment insurance in countries with low administrative capacity.  Workers do not need to
be enrolled with the social security administration to be entitled to severance pay; employers do
not need to make contributions; and the social security administration does not need to pay
benefits or monitor whether the beneficiaries are indeed unemployed.  Because compliance is
complaint-driven, rather than based on enrollment, the share of the labor force covered by the
scheme is potentially larger than the share of the formal sector.  And because there are no taxes
or administrative costs, other than those related to ex-post enforcement, the burden on the rest of
the economy should not be too heavy.
Mandatory severance pay  should not  distort the incentives faced by  workers either.
Those who lose their jobs because of misconduct are not entitled to severance pay.  As a result,
shirking at work carries an explicit penalty.  In efficiency wage models, employers elicit effort
by paying a wage premium, which workers lose if they are fired and have to take a "bad" job.
1Confronted with  mandatory severance pay,  employers could reduce this  premium,  and still
provide an  incentive for their workers to  put effort on their job.  Moreover, the amount of
severance pay received by workers who do lose their jobs is independent from the time they stay
unemployed.  Therefore, mandatory severance pay does not create an incentive for workers to
remain on the dole.
On the  other hand,  mandatory  severance pay  could affect  the  incentives faced by
employers. In this respect, mandatory severance pay is often seen as one of the most important
labor market distortions characterizing Latin American countries (see Marquez and Pages, 1998).
The increase in  separation costs resulting from this  mandate is a  potential deterrent to job
creation. Moreover, mandatory severance pay could allow covered workers to bargain for higher
wages, as replacing them would be more expensive for employers.  Formal sector employment
would therefore drop both because of higher (anticipated) separation costs and higher (current)
labor costs.
Finally, one key issue is whether mandatory severance pay is effective at smoothing the
consumption of workers who lose their jobs.  The answer crucially depends on the alternative
consumption smoothing mechanisms  available.  If  severance pay  displaced  precautionary
savings, or  intra-household transfers, its  benefits would be  minimal.  However, mandatory
severance pay  allows  some  risk  pooling among  workers and  employers,  so that  it  could
effectively operate as insurance.  If it did, its consumption smoothing benefits could outweigh
the allocation costs in a social welfare function that attaches a strong weight to the well-being of
urban, formal sector workers and their families (see Basu et. al., 1996).
Mandatory severance pay is certainly popular in Peru.  In November 1996, in the context
of its policy dialogue with multilateral organizations, the Peruvian government conveyed the
2impression that it wanted to  slash mandatory severance pay by  half.  As  a draft regulation
containing this  change made  it  to  the  news, there  was public-opinion  uproar,  forcing an
immediate reaction. Shortly after, the government announced that the publicized draft contained
an unfortunate typo, its true intention being to raise severance pay  by half.  This effectively
happened (Saavedra, 1999).  Since then, there have been no further changes to the (now more
generous) severance pay formula.
The aim of this paper is to assess the coverage and effects of mandatory severance pay in
Peru.  The choice of Peru is justified because this country has a very "generous" severance pay
regime.  Typically, separated workers are entitled to a couple of weeks of salary per year of
service, and severance pay caps at three or six months of salary are not uncommon.  The costs
and benefits observed in  Peru could thus be  seen  as an  upper bound  for other developing
countries.  The popularity of mandatory severance pay among vocal segments of the population
could suggest that the benefits  outweigh the  costs.  However, public-opinion uproar  is no
substitute for a thorough economic assessment. The interest of such an assessment is magnified
by the  fact that relatively little is known about the effects of  mandatory  severance pay  in
developing countries.
Based on the literature on industrial countries, mandatory severance pay  could affect
resource allocation.  While an earlier simulation using a calibrated model found a small impact
on employment (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990), a subsequent exercise claimed that the costs to
society could be considerable (Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993).  Analyses using cross-country
data from industrial countries showed a lower employment-to-population  ratio in countries with
higher severance pay  (Lazear,  1990; Addison and  Grosso,  1996) or  higher job  protection
(Nickell, 1997). And studies using sector-level data from Europe and the US concluded that job
3protection leads to more reliance on hours adjustment  than on employment adjustment (Abraham
and Houseman,  1994), and  to  smaller flows in  and  out  of  unemployment  (Blanchard and
Portugal, 2000).
The evidence is much more scattered concerning developing countries.  Given that only a
fraction of the labor force is covered by mandatory severance pay, it would be hazardous to
extrapolate the lessons from industrial countries. To the extent that coverage is endogenous, the
impact on resource allocation could be much smaller. Admittedly, a study linked high separation
costs  to  low  employment-to-population ratios  in  a  mixed  sample  of  industrial  and  Latin
American countries (Heckman and Pag6s, 2000). But in this study, separation costs appear to be
much higher in Latin America than in Western Europe, which is surprising. In a similar spirit, a
study using sector-level data from India and Zimbabwe showed a drop in labor demand after job
security regulations were made more stringent (Fallon and Lucas, 1991).  But the main policy
change in these two countries was an extension in the coverage of job security provisions, not an
increase in mandatory severance pay.  Finally, a study using employment data for specific age
groups in Chile claimed that job  security was associated with a decline in wage employment
among young workers (Pages and Montenegro, 1999). But no decline was observed for workers
who were 26-50 years old.
In the specific case of Peru, there is some evidence, based on plant-level data, suggesting
that mandatory severance pay does reduce formal sector employment.  Saavedra and Torero
(1999) measure firing costs for a panel of roughly 500 firms in the formal sector, based on the
average compensation these firms would have to pay if they fired all their workers.  Controlling
for average wage costs, firing costs appear to have a negative impact on labor demand in the late
1980s and early 1990s. The results could be questioned on methodological grounds, as a lagged
4value of the endogenous variable is included among the explanatory variables, thus making the
estimates inconsistent, given the chosen econometric technique.  Besides, the impact of firing
costs becomes statistically insignificant in the mid-1990s, despite the fact that severance pay
regulations were not eased.
This paper uses household-level data to evaluate the coverage and effects of mandatory
severance pay.  Household-level data offer a more credible basis for the empirical analysis than
cross-country data or plant-level data, not to mention simulations based on calibrated models.
This is because of the potential endogeneity of coverage, which is one of the main problems
when assessing the effects of a program.  In the case of Peru, the availability of a high-quality
household survey with  a panel  structure, known as  Encuesta Nacional  de  Hogares  Sobre
Medici6n de Niveles de Vida (ENNIV, 1995), allows implementing several empirical strategies
to deal with potential endogeneity biases.
Evaluating coverage is not a trivial issue in developing countries, as programs that are
efficient on paper (such as unemployment insurance) may only reach a small fraction of the labor
force, whereas more inefficient mandates (like severance pay) may be easier to implement.  In
this paper, coverage is assessed at the aggregate level but also by population quintiles, based on
the countrywide distribution of per capita consumption. This breakdown is justified because the
weight attached to the wellbeing of households in different quintiles varies with the objectives
that are being pursued.  Depending on whether the government is concerned about the poor, the
median voter, or the most vocal interest groups, the focus would be on the bottom, the middle or
the top quintiles respectively.
The effects of mandatory severance pay considered in this paper refer to labor costs and
consumption.  The employment effects of mandatory severance pay could be modest, or even
5negligible, if covered workers "paid" for their income support when unemployed through lower
wages while employed. They could also be low if the shirking penalty created by severance pay
reduced the wage premium needed to entice workers to put effort on their jobs.  But mandatory
severance pay could also allow covered workers to bargain for higher wages, knowing that they
can only be replaced at a higher cost.  As regards consumption, severance pay provides separated
workers with enough cash to spread the negative impact of job loss over several months or years.
The amount received could  even be  large enough to  lead to  an  increase  in  consumption.
However, severance pay would have no impact on consumption it were just  displacing other
consumption-smoothing  mechanisms.
2.  Regulations
Peru combines a heavy regulation of its labor market with very limited compliance, as
reflected by the large size of its informal sector. It is often claimed that these two characteristics
are related, as heavy regulation increases the cost of playing by  the rules  (De Soto,  1989;
Loayza, 1996).  However, it has also been argued that the implicit, dualistic view of the labor
market is not supported by the data (Maloney, 1999; Saavedra and Chong, 2000).  And causality
could very well go in the opposite direction, as the irrelevance of regulations would allow the
government to appear socially "generous" on paper, without having to bear large economic costs
in practice.  In any event, some of most stringent labor regulations of Peru were removed, or
eased, during the 1990s.
A potentially important change was the abolition of job  security for new hires, in 1991.
Until then, dismissals had to be approved  by the government. If they were deemed "unjustified",
the separated workers could choose between getting severance pay or being reinstated in their
6jobs.  The 1991 reform removed the need for government approval.  In 1995, job  security was
formally abolished for all workers. However, it must be noted that job security regulations had
been in place since 1970, giving employers enough time to find ways to bypass them.  Workers
were often hired on short-term contracts, dismissed before they reached the minimum seniority
needed for job security, and then re-hired. Those on longer contracts were sometimes required to
sign  an  undated  resignation  letter.  The  regulatory  framework itself  contained important
loopholes.  In 1971, the minimum seniority requirement was raised to three years, substantially
reducing the legal coverage of job  security provisions.  In 1986 minimum seniority was set at
three months only, but an emergency employment program was launched allowing employers to
hire workers without providing social security benefits, or stability (Saavedra, 1999).
While job security regulations lost much of their teeth during the early 1990s, mandatory
severance pay regulations were not substantially eased. The definition of "unjustified" dismissal
was made more restrictive in 1991.  The formula setting the amount to be paid in the event of
unjustified dismissal was modified four times over the decade, but its basic structure remained
the same, as shown in table 1.  This table also displays the timing of the three rounds of the
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares Sobre Medici6n de Niveles de Vida, so as to identify the specific
formula that was in force when the interviews took place.  These interviews were usually carried
out within two or three months of the launching date reported in the table.
Because job security regulations were potentially binding in 1991, the empirical analysis
in this paper focuses on the  1994 and  1997 rounds of the survey.  Admittedly, mandatory
severance pay increases the job  security of those who are covered by it, because it is more
expensive for an employer to fire them.  In the limit, for an amount of severance high enough, it
would be in the interest of the employer to retain the worker until retirement age, even if his or
7her productivity was zero.  However, in the case of Peru this amount cannot exceed one year of
salary, so that there is a clear difference between mandatory severance pay and mandatory job
security. Using data from 1991 would make it difficult to disentangle the effects of each of these
two constraints.  The implicit assumption, when focusing on  data from the  1994 and  1997
rounds, is that job security regulations were largely irrelevant in those two years.
In addition to severance pay, dismissed workers are entitled to an end-of-service gratuity,
known as Compensaci6n por Tiempo de Servicio.  This entitlement was created in 1963.  The
gratuity amounts to half a month of salary per year of service and it is payable to all workers at
the termination of their contracts, regardless of whether they are dismissed or they just quit or
retire.  Since 1991, the gratuity has to be deposited twice a year in a Bank account under the
worker's name.  Because these deposits are not contingent on any event other than employment,
the end-of-service gratuity can be seen as a  delayed compensation, rather than an additional
severance payment.  It  is  safe  to  assume that  workers who  are  covered (not  covered) by
severance pay regulations are also entitled (not entitled) to the end-of-service gratuity.
3.  Data
The Encuesta Nacional de Hogares Sobre Medicion de Niveles de  Vida is basically a
Living Standards Measurement Survey, or LSMS for short (Grosh and Glewwe, 1998).  The
design and methodology of its three rounds were similar, despite the fact that only the first two
were supported and monitored by the World Bank.  In particular, all three rounds tried to provide
a comprehensive  picture of the poorest households, whose active members are seldom concerned
by job security regulations. Thus, the 1994 and 1997 surveys had a national coverage, including
both urban and rural areas.  In 1991, the survey did not reach the whole country.  Instead, it
8covered urban areas and the rural sierra (highlands), allegedly because most  of the Peruvian
population lives in the former whereas many among the poor live in the latter.  In practice,
however, some provinces were excluded from the survey because terrorist activities made them
dangerous for the interviewers.  The partial coverage of the 1991 survey is a second reason for
this paper to focus on the 1994 and 1997 rounds only.
The number of households in the sample increased over time, from 2,308 in  1991, to
3,623 in 1994, to 3,843 in 1997. A large number of individuals can be found in two consecutive
rounds of the survey.  In particular, there were 3,493 individuals surveyed in both  1994 and
1997; hereafter these individuals are identified as the 1994-1997 panel.  Whenever possible, the
person answering the questionnaire was the household head.  While some of the information
collected refers to the household as a whole, the survey also inquired about each of its members.
In particular, questions related to  employment, unemployment, cash earnings and job-related
benefits were asked at the individual level.  Information on variables such as age, gender or
educational attainment was also collected at the individual level.  Information on housing or
expenditures is reported at the household level.
From the point of view of this paper, the key variables in the survey are those referring to
employment status and  to  coverage by  severance pay  regulations.  Following the  standard
practice, anyone who worked for a wage or salary, was self-employed, or worked in a family
business in the seven days preceding the survey, was considered employed.  Those who declared
to have a job,  even if they were  out of work in the week preceding the survey, were  also
considered employed.  On the other hand, anyone who was not  employed according to this
definition, and was actively searching a job in the week preceding the survey, was considered
9unemployed.  Those who were not employed, and were not actively seeking a job because they
were reportedly sick, or discouraged, were also counted among the unemployed.
Coverage by  severance  pay  regulations  is  more  difficult  to  assess,  because  these
regulations may not always be enforced. To address this difficulty, this paper does not rely on a
single variable but rather on  five coverage indicators, summarized in  table 2.  The "legal"
indicator is used to identify the workers who meet the formal requirements for coverage.  These
requirements combine the salaried status with some minimum seniority, as described in table 1.
Consequently, the legal label is not given to the self-employed, to family workers, or to salaried
workers who have only been in their jobs for a short period of time (how short depends on the
regulations in force at the time of the survey). Each of the other four coverage indicators focuses
on a job  characteristic that makes compliance with severance pay regulations more likely.  The
characteristics considered are: having a written contract with the employer ("contract"), being
enrolled with the social security system ("pension"), working in a firm where at least one trade
union operates ("trade union"), and working in an establishment  that employs at least 21 persons
in all ("large firm").
Each of the five coverage indicators can be used to construct a dummy variable, set equal
to one if the worker meets the corresponding requirement, and to zero otherwise.  For instance,
the "legal" dummy is equal to one for all workers who are legally entitled to  severance pay,
regardless of whether they have a written contract, are enrolled with social security, work in a
unionized firm, or in a large firmn.  It is set equal to zero for workers who are not legally entitled
to severance pay.  In much of the analysis in this paper, the legal indicator is interacted with each
of the other four indicators of coverage to generate another set of dummy variables, called "legal
+ contract", "legal  + social security", "legal  + trade union"  and  "legal +  large firm".  For
10instance, the "legal + contract" dummy is set equal to one for workers who are legally entitled to
severance pay and have a written contract, but are not enrolled with social security, do not work
in a unionized firm, and do not work in a large firm.
The five coverage indicators can also be combined to generate a job score, from "legal +
1" to "legal + 4".  The score "legal + 1" means that the worker is legally entitled to severance
pay  and his or her job  has  one  (but only one)  of the  other four characteristics that make
compliance more likely.  The score "legal +  2" means that the job  has two  of those  four
characteristics,  and so on and so forth.  It is safe to assume that the probability that a worker will
get severance pay in the event of unjustified dismissal increases with his or her job score.  For a
worker who gets a score of "legal + 4", this probability gets close to certainty.
Unfortunately, not all the coverage indicators can be computed in all three rounds of the
survey. The most detailed questionnaire in this respect is the one administered in 1994, and it is
therefore the one used hereafter to assess coverage. The 1991 round is the most parsimonious, as
it does not report whether the worker had a contract and does not provide information on the
total personnel of the employer.  The 1997 round, in tum, does not ask about unionization at the
workplace. Because of the limitations of the 1991 and 1997 rounds, the cross-sectional analyses
in this paper are all based on 1994 data.  As regards the longitudinal analyses, the parsimony of
the 1991 questionnaire  provides a third reason to discard it, and focus on the 1994-97  panel.  The
analyses  based on this panel do not take unionization into account.
Coverage can also be assessed, ex-post, for the unemployed.  In principle, the survey
questionnaire allows to construct coverage indicators and scores for the last job  held by the
respondent over the previous 12 months.  This information could be used to infer whether those
who were unemployed at the time of the survey did receive severance pay.  But there are two
11problems with this approach.  First, the survey does not report information on whether job loss
was voluntary or involuntary and, in the latter case, whether it was "unjustified" or not.  (Even if
it did, few respondents could be expected to declare that their employer was right to fire them.)
Second, answering questions related to the last job  involves a substantial recall effort by the
respondent.  Not surprisingly, information on the previous job  is altogether missing for many
among the unemployed. As a result, it is not possible to identify whom, among the unemployed,
are first-time  job seekers.
The approach used in this paper to infer coverage among the unemployed is based on
information about other income sources of the household over the previous  12 months.  The
questionnaire inquires about a large number of income sources, such as interest payments, rent,
alimonies, remittances, bequests and lottery prizes.  It also asks about payments related to old-
age pension of end-of service gratuity (lumped together) and to compensation (without further
detail).  Some households report receiving income from one of the last two sources once, and
only once, over the previous 12 months.  The paper assumes that a member of those households
did get severance pay.
This severance pay  indicator is potentially misleading in the early  1990s, when Peru
embarked in a large public sector downsizing program, involving more than a quarter million job
separations  (Haltiwanger  and  Singh,  1999).  As  a  result,  the  end-of-service  gratuity  or
compensation  reported by some households could bear no relation with the mandatory severance
pay scheme for private sector workers. Since separation packages for public sector workers were
based on a different formula, the estimates of the consumption impact of severance pay would be
biased.  The potential mix up between compensation packages for public sector workers and
12severance pay for private sector workers provides a fourth and last reason to base the analysis on
data from the 1994 and 1997 rounds of the LSMS survey only.
Other relevant variables for the analysis refer to labor earnings and consumption per
capita. Labor earnings were calculated for the main occupation, including payments both in cash
and in kind.  The survey questionnaire is quite detailed concerning the latter.  As regards the
former, it refers explicitly to "net" payments, which means that contributions in the name of the
worker to  the social  security administration, or  towards the end-of-service  gratuity, are in
principle not counted as labor earnings.  However, the extent to which interviewers actually
stuck to the questionnaire, and deducted contributions from "gross" payments, is unclear.  Data
on consumption per  capita were taken from other studies dealing with poverty in Peru.  A
detailed description of the methodology used in those other studies to calculate consumption
based on expenditure data can be  found in  World Bank (1999).  Both the earnings and the
consumption figures are measured at June 1994 prices.
4.  Coverage and Beneficiaries
Slightly more than one in five private sector workers is legally entitled to severance pay
in Peru, as shown in table 3 (the exact figure in this table is 21.15 percent).  This fraction is not
as low as it may appear as a first glance, as many private sector workers are self-employed or
work in household enterprises.  The salaried relationship is not as common in a country at that
development level as it is in industrial countries.  In Peru, less than two thirds of private sector
workers are wage eamers.  Many among them do not have the minimum seniority to be entitled
to severance pay.  Overall, roughly one in three private sector wage earners (= 21.15/62.60) is
legally entitled to severance pay.
13Both the salaried relationship and entitlement to severance pay are more prevalent among
relatively  wealthier workers.  Table  3  presents  a  breakdown  of  coverage  indicators  by
consumption quintiles, based on the distribution of consumption per capita among all Peruvians
(and not just among private sector workers).  In this table, the share of private sector workers
who are legally entitled to severance pay increases monotonically with the consumption level,
from roughly  15 percent in the poorest quintile to almost 30 percent in  the richest quintile.
However, the share of wage earners who are entitled to severance pay does not depend so much
on wealth.  It is equal to 34 percent for both the poorest quintile (= 15.12/44.74) and the richest
quintile (=  29.05/76.55).  It  follows that  most  of  the  variation  in  legal  coverage  across
consumption quintiles is due to variation in the prevalence of the salaried relationship.
Legal coverage does not guarantee that severance will be paid in the event of separation.
Table 3 shows that all of the attributes that make compliance more likely are highly correlated
with wealth.  For instance, the  share of private  sector workers who  are legally entitled to
severance and in addition are enrolled with social security varies from half of one percent in the
poorest quintile to more than 16 percent in the richest quintile. The picture is similar when job
scores are considered instead, as shown in table 4.  Very few private sector workers get the job
score "legal + 4", even in the top quintiles.  On the other hand, almost 10 percent on them get a
score equal to "legal + 1" or higher.  This represents slightly less than half of the private sector
workers are legally entitled to severance pay.  However, this ratio ranges from one tenth in the
poorest quintile to almost two thirds in the richest quintile.
The fraction of the unemployed who actually received severance pay appears to be much
lower than the fraction of private sector workers who are covered by it.  The distribution of the
unemployed by consumption quintile is displayed in table 5.  The average unemployment rate in
14the sample is  around 7 percent.  The unemployment rate is highest in  the third and  fourth
quintiles and lowest in the poorest quintile.  Receiving severance pay is  also more common
among the middle class and quite uncommon among the poor.  Overall, few unemployed persons
appear to have received severance pay.  This result is partly due to two measurement problems.
First, the unemployed include many first-time job  seekers, who obviously are not entitled to
severance pay.  Unfortunately, it is not possible to identify them in the data, as information on
previous activity is missing for too many respondents. Second, some (if not most) of the workers
who got severance pay over the previous year might have found a job  in the meantime, so that
they are not considered unemployed at the time of the survey.
hi spite of these measurement problems, it also appears that workers who are covered by
severance pay are less likely to lose their jobs.  Table 6 displays the changes in employment
status for the respondents of the 1994 round who were surveyed again in  1997.  The figures in
this table do not allow to infer job market transitions, as the time span between two consecutive
rounds is too long.  Still, among the private sector workers who had a score of "legal + 2" or
higher in 1994, only 1.4 percent (= 1/74) were unemployed in 1997.  The share is substantially
higher for all other groups, including those who were in the public sector.  It is equal to 7.9
percent for those who were in the private sector but had the job score "legal + 1" or less, and to
10.2 percent for those who were unemployed or out of the labor force.
This crude comparison suggests that those effectively covered by mandatory severance
pay enjoy a substantial job security. However, based on this crude comparison it is not possible
to identify the direction of causality.  Coverage by mandatory severance makes job  separation
more expensive, so that higher job security could be the result of the regulation.  On the other
hand, employers know this, and in many cases can decide whether to offer coverage to their
15workers.  For instance, at the time of the  1994 round, the key  decision for employers was
whether to extend the work relationship beyond 12 months. It is plausible that this threshold was
crossed only for workers who were expected to stay with the enterprise within the foreseeable
future, either  because  of  their  high  productivity or  because  of  their  relationship with  the
employer. Coverage would thus be revealing a characteristic of the worker that is observable to
the employer, but not to outsiders.
5.  Impact  on Earnings
Workers who are covered by mandatory severance pay could earn less than other, similar
workers if they "paid" for their higher job  security through lower wages.  Or they could earn
more, if this higher job security allowed them to extract rents from their employers.  The main
problem in  trying to  assess whether they actually earn more or  less is  self-selection.  The
discussion in the previous section suggests that coverage could be associated with unobservable
worker characteristics, such as talent, information or connections, in which case it would be
difficult to disentangle the differences in earnings due to coverage from the differences due to
these unobservable characteristics.  In particular, the coefficients of an ordinary least-squares
(OLS) regression linking earnings and coverage indicators would be biased.  And it is difficult to
find an appropriate instrument to apply Heckman selectivity-corrected estimators.
This paper uses two empirical strategies to address the self-selection problem.  One of
them is household fixed effects.  The implicit identifying assumption in this approach is that the
unobservable characteristics that underlie coverage are correlated across household members.
The household fixed effects approach implicitly focuses on households that have at least two
wage earners, and "removes" any systematic difference between their earnings and those of
16individuals in other households.  This approach can be implemented with cross-sectional data,
without requiring two points in time.  In this paper it is applied to data from the 1994 survey.
The  second empirical strategy relies on individual fixed effects.  In this  case, the implicit
comparison is between the earnings of the same individual between two points in time.  Table 6
showed that a large number of individuals moved from covered to uncovered jobs, and vice-
versa, between 1994 and 1997.  The individual fixed effects approach exploits these changes in
coverage to assess whether they bear a  systematic relationship with the observed changes in
earnings. The approach is implemented using data from the 1994-1997  panel.
The first of these two approaches has some advantages over the second one. In particular,
the households fixed effects approach can be applied to data from the 1994 round of the survey,
which is the only one containing information on all five coverage indicators.  By requiring two
points  in  time, the  individual fixed effects approach leads to  the  loss of  the  unionization
indicator.  Unionized workers are more likely to be entitled to severance pay.  If trade union
membership  affected  wages,  the  omission  of  the  unionization  indicator  would  bias  the
coefficients multiplying the other coverage indicators. Another advantage of the household fixed
effects approach is that  it allows to  use a much larger number of  observations, so that the
estimates should be  more precise.  Finally, with  the household fixed effects approach it is
possible to use a larger set of controls, as members of the same household typically differ in their
individual characteristics. Most individual characteristics are the same at two points in time, so
that they are dropped in the individual fixed effects approach.  Because of these advantages,
household fixed effects is the preferred approach in this paper.
Eamings functions estimated using household fixed effects and individual fixed effects
are presented  in tables  8  and  9  respectively.  An  attempt was  also  made to  estimate the
17regressions in tables 8 and 9 using random effects, rather than fixed effects.  Results are not
reported, however,  as these  regressions failed to  pass  the Hausman  test.  For comparison
purposes only, table 7 presents results obtained applying OLS to data from the 1994 survey.  In
this case, it is not necessary to restrict the sample to households with at least two income earners.
As a result, the number of observations is substantially larger than in  table 8.  Despite this
difference in sample size, the gap between the coefficients multiplying the coverage indicators in
tables 7 and 8 can be interpreted as resulting from self-selection  bias.
The explained variable in tables  7 to  9  is the  log  of  labor earnings, with  eamings
measured both on an hourly basis and on a monthly basis.  The monthly earnings variable does
not take into account the number of hours worked. The latter variable is not included among the
regressors, however, as it is clearly endogenous.  The first two columns in tables 7 to 9 refer to
private sector workers only.  The last two columns replicate the analysis for a broader sample,
including workers who have ajob  in the public sector. A dummy variable is included among the
explanatory  variables in these two columns to account for the possible earnings gap between the
public and the private  sector.  The most relevant explained variable, when  trying to  assess
whether workers "pay" for their severance pay coverage, is hourly earnings in the private sector.
Therefore, from the point of view of this paper, the first column in tables 7 to 9 is the preferred
one. The results in the other columns are mainly used as a check.
Other  explanatory variables in  tables 7  and  8  are standard in  the  analysis of  labor
earnings. They control for gender, schooling, experience, position in the household and region
of residence.  The regressions also take the cultural background of the respondent into account.
In a  country with a  large indigenous population, mainly  speaking Quechua, fluency in  the
official language (Spanish) cannot be taken for granted.  The inclusion of a dummy variable for
18Spanish as the mother tongue substantially  reduces the estimated returns to schooling, and blurs
the comparison with other studies on this issue.  However, the focus of this paper is on the
impact of severance pay coverage, not on returns to schooling.
These other explanatory variables are not included in the regressions in table 9, as most
of them should be invariant over time.  For instance, some workers could display more years of
education in 1997 than in 1994, but this change is most likely to reflect measurement error than
additional schooling. The only characteristic that does change for a large number of individuals
is work experience. Unfortunately, work experience is measured in the conventional way, as the
number of years of age minus the number of years of education minus six.  As a result, most
workers have three more years of experience in  1997 than they had in  1994, and it becomes
difficult to  disentangle the  effects of those  additional three years  from the  effects of  other
changes in the general economic context.  The combined effects are captured by the coefficient
on the year variable in table 9.
The results obtained when using ordinary least squares, in table 7, suggest that workers
who  are legally  entitled to  severance pay  and,  in  addition, have  a  written  contract,  earn
substantially more that other workers.  If these results were not tainted by self-selection, they
would imply that  coverage  allows workers to  extract rents  from their  employers.  This  is
perfectly plausible, as are also other results in this table.  For instance, the coefficient on the
unionization indicator is large and statistically significant when all the employed are considered,
which is consistent with the idea that trade unions raise the earnings of their members, especially
in the public sector.  And the coefficient on large firms is positive in all specifications, and
significantly so in two of them, which is consistent with previous evidence on the effect of firm
19size on earnings (see Schaffner, 1998). However, all of these effects vanish when unobservable
differences among workers are taken into account.
Based on the household fixed effects approach, which is the one preferred in this paper,
private sector workers who are legally entitled to severance pay earn roughly 12 percent less per
hour than workers who are not (see the first column in table 8). On the other hand, they also tend
to work longer hours, so that their monthly earnings are substantially higher than those of
workers who are not legally entitled to severance pay (second column).  Coefficients are similar
when all the employed are considered, but the downward effect on hourly earnings becomes
statistically insignificant. The impact of legal coverage on earnings is not affected by any of the
effective coverage indicators, as shown by the lack of significance of all other coefficients in the
first panel of this table.  The results in the second panel suggest that coverage indicators do not
have a separate impact on earnings either.
The picture that emerges from the individual fixed effects estimates in table 9 is not too
different, but the fit of the regressions is poor.  Taken literally, legal entitlement to severance pay
has no significant impact on hourly earnings, but is associated with monthly earnings which are
15 to 20 percent higher.  However, the hypothesis that all the coefficients in table 9 are equal to
zero cannot be rejected at the 5 percent significance level.  This results from the high noise-to-
signal ratio characterizing individual fixed effects regressions of this sort.
6.  Impact on Consumption
While coverage by mandatory severance pay regulations concerns individual workers,
consumption is determined at the household level.  Therefore, an empirical analysis of the impact
of severance pay on individual consumption has to take into account household characteristics,
20and not just individual characteristics. Two of the most relevant household characteristics are its
size and age composition.  Other things equal, individual consumption can be expected to be
lower when there are more mouths to feed and when there are fewer potential income earners. A
third relevant characteristic is the households' ability to smooth consumption on its own.  In the
LSMS survey this ability can be captured through the household's access to credit (as revealed
by the possession of at least one credit card), or through its possession of a bank account in the
12 months preceding the survey.
The individual characteristics  to consider are also slightly different from those used in the
earnings analysis.  Severance pay regulations can affect the consumption level of individuals
who are at work. This is because coverage has a potential impact on the labor earnings of those
individuals, and also on the savings decisions of the households they belong to.  But severance
pay regulations should also affect the consumption level of individuals who are unemployed, as
the consumption smoothing ability of  the households they belong  to probably  depends on
whether they actually got severance pay.  Consequently, the sample has to include both the
employed and the unemployed, and the specification has to consider appropriate severance pay
indicators for each group.  The regressions presented in this section include among their right-
hand-side variables both the coverage indicators used in the earnings analysis and the dummy
variable for actual severance pay used in the coverage analysis.
An OLS regression linking individual consumption to these coverage and severance pay
indicators  would  suffer  from  the  same  self-selection problems  as  the  earnings  functions
considered in the previous section. Unfortunately, one of the two approaches used in that section
to correct the self-selection problem cannot be applied in this case. The households fixed effects
approach focuses on the difference in outcomes between individuals belonging to the same
21household.  By construction, however, consumption per capita is the same for all adult members
of the same household.  In the absence of variation in the explained variable, the households
fixed effects approach  cannot be  implemented.  Results  are thus  presented  only  for  OLS
regressions (in table 10) and the individual fixed effects approach (in table 11).
The number of observations in  these two tables is  larger than in  the corresponding
earnings tables (7 and 9 respectively).  This is because information on earnings is missing for a
considerable number of workers.  The regressions in table 10 refer to all labor force participants
in 1994.  Those in table  11 refer to all individuals who participated in the labor force in both
1994 and 1997.  In both tables, the label "job characteristics" is used  to identify the set of
dummy variables  indicating whether the  individual has  a  contract, is  enrolled  with  social
security, is a member of a trade union or works for a large firm.  The specifications used in table
11 omit all the individual and household characteristics that should be relatively stable over time,
so as to reduce the noise in the data.
The impact of household characteristics on consumption, reported in the third panel of
table 10, is relatively uncontroversial.  At the sample mean, adding a person of working age to
the household reduces consumption per capita by roughly 6 percent.  The drop in consumption is
more than twice as large if this person is less than 15 or more than 64 years old.  On the other
hand, having access to credit or previous savings substantially boosts consumption.  In this case,
the estimates in table 10, when using ordinary least squares, are almost four times larger than
those in table 11, when using individual fixed effects.  This is an indication of self-selection.  It
suggests that households which are relatively more productive (in unobservable ways) also tend
to have better possibilities to smooth their consumption.
22From the point of view of this paper, the most interesting results are those concerning the
impact of severance pay on consumption.  Based on those results, it is difficult to claim that
coverage by severance pay has a significant impact on consumption among those who have a
job.  When using  fixed effects, all the coefficients multiplying the coverage  indicators are
statistically insignificant. At a first glance, the absence of any impact on consumption seems to
contradict the negative impact on hourly earnings, revealed by table 9.  These two outcomes are
not  inconsistent, however, if  the additional income security resulting from  coverage entices
households to reduce their precautionary savings.
Conversely, actually receiving severance pay has a substantial impact on consumption.
Those who are unemployed and received no severance pay consume, on average, 15 percent less
than those who are employed.  The actual impact could actually be  larger, as the estimated
coefficient refers to all the unemployed, including both workers who lost their jobs and first-time
job seekers, and the latter should not experience any drop in consumption.  An actual impact in
excess of  15 percent is in line with results obtained elsewhere.  For the US, Gruber (1997)
estimates that job loss would entail a 20 percent drop in food consumption if the replacement rate
of the unemployment insurance system were set equal to zero
On the other hand, those who are unemployed and received severance pay  consume
substantially more percent more than those who did not.  In table 10, the coefficient multiplying
the severance pay  variable is  very similar to the coefficient multiplying  the unemployment
variable, suggesting that the consumption impact of job  loss is  totally offset.  However, the
results  in  this  table  may  suffer  from self-selection bias,  as  revealed by  the  gap  with  the
coefficients obtained using the individual fixed effects approach.  According to table 11, those
23who received severance pay consume roughly 25 percent more than those who did  not.  It
follows that they consume about 10 percent more than those who are employed.
Finally, the regressions in tables 10 and 11 interact the unemployment and the severance
pay variables with access to  credit.  The impact of unemployment on consumption could be
expected to be  smaller for households who can smooth consumption on their own, and the
impact of severance pay should be smaller as well.  However, the coefficients multiplying the
interactive terms in tables 10 and 12 do not conform to the expected pattern.  Access to credit
does not appear to mitigate the consumption loss of the unemployed.  And it seems to boost the
consumption level of those who get severance pay, as if the latter was perceived as a windfall by
its beneficiaries.
7.  Conclusion
Mandatory severance pay can be found in many (if not most) developing countries. If the
case of Peru serves as an indication, it is highly popular among vocal segmnents  of the urban
population. Of course, popularity should not be confused with soundness.  But there are some a
priori reasons to believe that the benefits of mandatory severance pay could exceed its costs,
especially  in  countries  with  low  institutional  capacity.  The  only  direct  burden  on  the
government's budget is related to the handling of  non-compliance complaints; there are no
incentives for separated workers to stay out of a job; and those who are at work could "pay" for
their coverage through lower wages.  On the other hand, mandatory severance pay could make
firing more costly to employers, and therefore discourage hiring.
This paper is, to our knowledge, the first to provide a thorough assessment of mandatory
severance pay in a developing country. The paper shows that one in five private sector workers,
24and  one in three  private sector  wage earners,  is legally  entitled  to severance  pay in the event of
unjustified  dismissal. This figure  is higher  than it may appear  at a first glance, as wage  earners
include  rural laborers  and informal  sector  workers. However,  the coverage  rate is twice as large
in the richest  population  quintile  than in the poorest one. This gap is amplified  when effective
coverage  indicators  are considered.  The  jobs of only  half of the workers  who are legally  covered
have any of the features that make compliance  more likely. These features include:  having  a
written contract,  being enrolled  with social security,  working in a unionized enterprise,  and
working  for a large enterprise. Less than five percent of private sector workers in the poorest
two quintiles  of the population  have  jobs with any of these  features,  compared  to twenty  percent
among  the richest  quintile. Finally,  the results of the paper also suggest  that workers  who are
entitled to severance  pay are less likely to become unemployed,  but it is unfortunately  not
possible  to disentangle  cause  and effect.
The paper  also provides  some  evidence  that workers  do "pay" for their coverage  through
lower  hourly wages,  but the evidence  is not conclusive  in this respect. The main problem  is the
endogeneity  of coverage:  those who are entitled  to severance  pay may also be "better"  workers
hence have the potential to earn more.  The paper uses two different empirical  strategies  to
"remove"  the unobservable  worker  heterogeneity.  One of them fails, as it introduces  too much
noise in the data, thus leading to unreliable  estimates. The results obtained  with the other one
imply that workers  who are legally  entitled  to severance  pay earn roughly 10 percent less per
hour than those  who are not, but the statistical  significance  of the estimated  coefficients  is not
too high.  On the other hand, covered workers also work more hours, so that their monthly
earnings  are higher.
Finally,  some  of the most interesting  results  in this paper  refer to the ability  of mandatory
severance  pay to smooth consumption. If uncovered  workers  saved more, or borrowed  from
25friends and family, to confront the effects of job loss, mandatory severance pay would only be
displacing these other self-insurance mechanisms. However, it appears that individuals who are
unemployed and did not receive severance pay consume roughly 15 percent less than those who
are at work.  Those who are unemployed and did receive severance pay, on the other hand,
consume about 10 percent more.  The first of these two results imply that mandatory severance
pay is  an  effective consumption smoothing instrument.  The second result reveals  that the
severance pay formula used in Peru is unnecessarily generous.
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27Table 1
Severance Pay in the Event of "Unjustified" Dismissal
Severance pay formula  Household
Date  Regulation  (W = monthly wage and T = years of service)  survey
o  if  T <O.4
3xW  if  0.4  Tr< 1
June 1986  L. 24514  6  i  1  3
October 1991  _  Yes
0  if  T<1
November 1991  D.L 728  3  i  l￿T<3
T xW  if  3 :!6r <l2
12 xW  if  12 ￿!6r 
April 1994  Y  w  ates
July 1995  L. 26513  T1W  if  T12  .!5
1.5xTxW  if  T<8
November 1996  D.L. 855
12  if  8 ￿r-
SFeptember  1997  Yes
Notes: Since  1963, all workers are  entitled to  an  end-of-service gratuity, regardless of the
reasons for job  termination.  The gratuity, which is paid in addition to severance pay,
amounts to  half  a month  of  salary per  year of  service.  The date  reported  for the
household surveys corresponds to the first month of the field work.  Interviews usually
took place within a quarter. L. stands for ley and D.L. for decreto legislativo.
Source: Constructed by the authors based on Saavedra (1999).Table 2
Indicators of Severance Pay Coverage
In each of the Household Surveys
Household survey
Indicator  1991  1994  1997
Legal  Wage earner in private sector  Wage earner in private sector  Wage earner in private sector
Tenure in job Ž 3 months  Tenure in job > 12 months  Any tenure
Contract  Not available  Has a signed contract  Has an open-ended contract
Socia  security  Worker is enrolled with IPSS or  Worker is enrolled with IPSS,  Worker is enrolled with IPSS,
Social security  military pension plan  police or military pension plan  police or military pension plan
Trade union  Firm is unionized  Firm is unionized  Not available
Large firm  Not available  Firm's employment Ž 21  Firm's employment > 21
Maximum score  Legal + 2  Legal + 4  Legal + 3
Notes: These indicators are set  equal to  one when the corresponding criterion is met,  and  equal to  zero otherwise.  They are
necessarily equal to zero for self-employed and unpaid family workers, as well as for public sector workers.  The maximum
score is the highest possible figure for the sum of effective coverage indicators in each of the surveys. IPSS stands for Instituto
Peruano de Seguridad Social.
Source: Constructed by the authors based on table 1 and LSMS questionnaires.
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Coverage Indicators among Private Sector Workers
By Consumption Quintile, 1994 Survey
Consumption quintile (based on entire population)
Coverage indicator
in current job  Poorest  2 nd  3 rd  4th  Richest  All
No  84.88  83.99  80.24  73.49  70.95  78.85
Yes  15.12  16.01  19.76  26.51  29.05  21.15
Legal +  No  99.50  99.39  96.98  94.08  89.86  96.04
Contract  Yes  0.50  0.61  3.02  5.92  10.14  3.96
Legal +  No  99.44  97.41  94.59  89.42  83.85  93.08
Social security  Yes  0.56  2.59  5.41  10.58  16.15  6.92
Legal +  No  99.75  99.11  98.71  97.43  95.61  98.16
Trade union  Yes  0.25  0.89  1.29  2.57  4.39  1.84
Legal-+  No  99.25  98.43  95.43  92.21  88.58  94.87
Large firm  Yes  0.75  1.57  4.57  7.79  11.42  5.13
Private sector workers  21.30  19.45  20.59  19.04  19.61  100.00
No  55.26  42.85  36.23  27.49  23.45  37.40
Wage earners  Yes  44.74  57.15  63.77  72.51  76.55  62.60
Notes: Refers to the LSMS sample, without applying factors of expansion. Private sector workers include wages earners, but also the
self-employed  and unpaid family workers. For a definition of the effective coverage indicators, see table 2.
Source: Authors' calculations based on LSMS data.
30Table 4
Coverage Score among Private Sector Workers
By Consumption Quintile, 1994 Survey
Severance pay  Consumption  quintile (based on entire population)
Job score  coverage based on
current job's  score  Poorest  2nd  3rd  4th  Richest  All
No  84.88  83.99  80.24  73.49  70.95  78.85
Legal  Yes  15.12  16.01  19.76  26.51  29.05  21.15
Below score  98.44  95.84  92.02  85.80  80.07  90.66
Legal + I  Equal or higher  1.56  4.16  7.98  14.20  19.93  9.34
Below score  99.56  98.84  95.95  92.00  86.89  94.78
Legal + 2  Equal or higher  0.44  1.16  4.05  8.00  13.11  5.22
Below score  99.94  99.66  98.20  96.31  93.18  97.52
Legal + 3  Equal or higher  0.06  0.34  1.80  3.69  6.82  2.48
Below score  100.00  100.00  99.55  99.03  97.77  99.28
Legal + 4  Equal  or higher  0.00  0.00  0.45  0.97  2.23  0.72
Notes: Refers to the LSMS sample, without applying factors of expansion.  Private sector workers include wages earners, but also the
self-employed and unpaid family workers.  The score is the sum of the severance pay coverage indicators.  For a definition of
these indicators, see table 2.
Source:  Authors' calculations, based on LSMS data.
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Unemployed and Severance Pay Beneficiaries
By Consumption Quintile, 1994 Survey
Severance  pay indicators  Consumption quintile (based on entire population)
(refer to last job)  Poorest  2nd  3rd  4th  Richest  All
Got severance  No  98.67  97.89  96.18  95.04  95.45  96.38
(unemployed only)  Yes  1.33  2.11  3.82  4.96  4.55  3.62
All the unemployed  13.59  17.21  23.73  25.54  19.93  100.0
All labor force participants  20.90  19.28  20.76  19.42  19.64  100.0
Unemployment  rate  5.61  6.87  8.25  8.82  6.34  7.22
Notes: Refers to the LSMS sample, without applying factors of expansion. To be counted as unemployed a person had to be actively
searching a job in the 7 days preceding the survey, or be a discouraged job seeker.  First-time job seekers are included among
the unemployed.  When the household of the unemployed person received one, and only one, indemnity or social payment in
the 12 months preceding the survey, it is assumed that the unemployed member got severance pay.
Source: Authors' calculations based on LSMS data.
32Table 6
Changes in Employment Status, 1994-1997  Panel
Employment status in 1997
Public  Private sector  job  Out of  All in
sector  Higher  Legal  Legal  Not  Unem-  the labor  1994
Employment status in 1994  job  Score  + I  Only  Covered  force
Public sector  job  76  5  6  8  18  3  7  123
Higher score  9  33  7  10  10  1  4  74
Private  Legal+ 1  3  14  9  11  15  5  6  63
sector
job  Legal only  3  4  4  54  69  5  6  145
Not covered  17  21  23  101  558  38  84  842
Unemployed  3  5  7  26  28  11  21  101
Out ofthe labor force  26  10  13  61  169  64  291  634
All in 1997  137  77  69  271  867  127  419  1982
Notes: Refers to the LSMS sample, without applying factors of expansion. Private sector workers include wages earners, but also the
self-employed and unpaid family workers. Excludes persons below 15 or above 64 years of age.
Source: Authors' calculations based on LSMS data.
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Labor Earnings by Coverage Indicator
OLS Estimates, 1994 Survey
Dependent variable:
Log of earnings, in nuevos soles at June 1994 prices
Private sector  jobs  All the employed
Hourly  Monthly  Hourly  Monthly
Explanatory  variables  earnings  earmings  earnings  earnings
Legal  (yes  = 1)  -0.0482  0.0266  -0.0420  0.0303
(-1.439)  (0.789)  (-1.274)  (0.915)
Legal  + Contract  (yes = 1)  0.2142  **  0.0897  0.1297  **  0.0109
(2.100)  (0.918)  (2.037)  (0.181)
Legal  + Social  security  (yes  = 1)  -0.0172  -0.0197  -0.0213  -0.0420
(-0.229)  (-0.249)  (-0.359)  (-0.692)
Legal  + Trade  union  (yes = 1)  0.1437  0.2035  0.0242  0.1340  *
(0.913)  (1.225)  (0.333)  (1.804)
Legal  + Large  firm  (yes = 1)  0.0980  0.0305  0.1429 **  0.1237  **
(1.105)  (0.364)  (2.370)  (2.095)
Contract  (yes  = 1)  -0.0786  -0.0064  -0.0003  0.0681  *
(-0.781)  (-0.074)  (-0.007)  (1.693)
Social  security  (yes= 1)  0.1815  ***  0.2504  ***  0.1907  ***  0.2826  ***
(2.818)  (3.600)  (4.259)  (5.957)
Trade  union  (yes  = 1)  0.0123  -0.0395  0.1347  ***  0.0343
(0.084)  (-0.256)  (3.126)  (0.811)
Large  firm  (yes  = 1)  0.0661  0.1601  **  0.0309  0.0779  **
(0.861)  (2.263)  (0.754)  (1.997)
Public  sectorjob (yes  = 1)  0.0251  -0.1214  **
(0.541)  (-2.495)
Individual  characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Regional  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
R2  0.214  0.292  0.237  0.299
F test  81.62  117.60  105.62  126.14
Number  of observations  4493  4495  5158  5160
Notes: Estimated by  ordinary  least squares, using  White  heteroskedasticty-corrected errors.
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  Significant coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
level are indicated by one, two and three asterisks respectively.  Excludes those who
work less than 35 hours per week.
Source: Authors' calculations based on LSMS data.
34Table 8
Labor Earnings by Coverage Indicator
Household Fixed Effects, 1994 Survey
Dependent variable:
Log of earnings, in nuevos soles at June 1994 prices
Private sector  jobs  All the employed
Hourly  Monthly  Hourly  Monthly
Explanatory variables  earnings  earnings  eamings  earnings
Legal  (yes = 1)  -0.1150  *  0.1202  **  -0.0730  0.1401  ***
(-1.815)  (2.168)  (-1.244)  (2.703)
Legal  + Contract  (yes = 1)  -0.0030  -0.0128  -0.1195  -0.0967
(-0.017)  (-0.070)  (-0.991)  (-0.774)
Legal  + Social  security  (yes  1)  -0.0603  -0.0038  0.0230  -0.0897
(-0.439)  (-0.027)  (0.217)  (-0.835)
Legal  + Trade  union  (yes  = 1)  -0.0975  -0.1082  0.1295  0.0877
(-0.323)  (-0.363)  (0.837)  (0.539)
Legal  + Large  firm  (yes  =1)  0.1025  -0.1101  0.1850  0.0999
(0.661)  (-0.733)  (1.643)  (0.879)
Contract  (yes = 1)  -0.0869  0.0667  0.0031  0.1099
(-0.553)  (0.425)  (0.037)  (1.255)
Social  security  (yes  = 1)  0.1225  0.1047  0.0805  0.2303  ***
(1.080)  (0.915)  (1.074)  (2.951)
Tradeunion(yes= 1)  0.3397  0.3485  0.1364  0.1685  *
(1.243)  (1.300)  (1.503)  (1.784)
Large  firm  (yes  = 1)  -0.0243  0.1728  -0.1287*  -0.0182
(-0.194)  (1.465)  (-1.745)  (-0.249)
Public  sector  job (yes  = 1)  0.0149  0.0264
(0.166)  (0.303)
Individual  characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Regional  dummies  No  No  No  No
Overall  R 2 0.098  0.150  0.114  0.182
F test  5.07  27.29  5.68  32.26
Number  of observations  1545  2773  2165  3464
Notes: Fixed-effect estimates, with t-statistics reported in parentheses.  Only households with
two wage earners or more are included. Significant coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
level are indicated by one, two and three asterisks respectively.  Excludes those who
work less than 35 hours per week.
Source: Authors' calculations based on LSMS data.
35Table  9
Labor Earnings by Coverage Indicator
Individual Fixed Effects, 1994-1997  Panel
Dependent  variable:
Log of earnings,  in nuevos  soles at June 1994 prices
Private sector jobs  All the employed
Hourly  Monthly  Hourly  Monthly
Explanatory  variables  earnings  earnings  earnings  earnings
Legal (yes = 1)  0.0631  0.1639*  0.0806  0.1929 **
(0.619)  (1.698)  (0.855)  (2.183)
Legal + Contract (yes = 1)  0.1278  0.1141  -0.0141  -0.0255
(0.269)  (0.253)  (-0.068)  (-0.130)
Legal + Social security (yes =  1)  -0.2730  -0.1681  -0.1574  -0.2125
(-0.930)  (-0.605)  (-0.702)  (-1.011)
Legal + Large firm (yes = 1)  0.7015 **  0.4420  0.3502  0.2224
(2.216)  (1.474)  (1.613)  (1.093)
Contract (yes = 1)  0.0350  -0.0292  0.1447  0.0674
(0.078)  (-0.069)  (0.972)  (0.483)
Social security (yes = 1)  0.2310  0.2108  0.1197  0.2223
(0.970)  (0.934)  (0.698)  (1.384)
Large firm (yes = 1)  -0.3909  -0.1780  -0.0860  0.0311
(-1.408)  (-0.677)  (-0.523)  (0.202)
Public sector job (yes = 1)  0.1377  0.0242
(0.707)  (0.133)
Individual characteristics  No  No  No  No
Regional dummies  No  No  No  No
Year 1997 (yes=  1)  -0.1124 **  -0.0833 *  -0.0647  -0.0261*
(-2.330)  (-1.822)  (-1.526)  (-0.656)
Overall R2 0.059  0.076  0.087  0.097
F test  1.89  1.84  1.12  1.47
Number of observations  1364  1364  1628  1628
Notes:  Fixed-effect  estimates,  with  t-statistics  reported  in  parentheses.  There  are  two
observations  per  person.  Significant  coefficients  at  the  10,  5  and  1 percent  level  are
indicated  by  one,  two  and  three  asterisks  respectively.  Excludes  those  who  work  less
than  35 hours per week,  and those whose  change in log earnings  between  1994 and  1997
was lower than -0.5  or higher than 0.5.
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on LSMS data.
36Table  10
Consumption per Capita by Employment Status
OLS Estimates, 1994 Survey
Dependent variable:
Explanatory  variables  Log of consumption, in nuevos soles at June 1994 prices
Unemployed  (yes = 1)  -0.1343 ***  -0.1469 ***  -0.1352 ***  -0.1457 ***
(-5.613)  (-5.525)  (-5.660)  (-5.485)
Unemployed  x Savings or access to credit  0.0517  0.0432
(0.927)  (0.776)
Got severance (yes=1)  0.1407***  0.1390 ***  0.0574  0.0581
(3.268)  (3.236)  (1.172)  (1.186)
Got severance x Savings or access to credit  0.2239 **  0.2183 **
(2.463)  (2.402)
Legal (yes = 1)  -0.0958  ***  -0.0962 ***  -0.0958 ***  -0.0960 ***
(-5.125)  (-5.142)  (-5.121)  (-5.135)
Legal + Contract (yes = 1)  0.0849 *  0.0853 *  0.0843 *  0.0847 *
(1.808)  (1.817)  (1.795)  (1.803)
Legal + Social security (yes = 1)  0.0634  0.0633  0.0624  0.0624
(1.531)  (1.528)  (1.506)  (1.504)
Legal + Trade union (yes = 1)  0.0954  0.0954  0.0951  0.0951
(1.563)  (1.563)  (1.557)  (1.557)
Legal + Large firm (yes = 1)  0.0408  0.0406  0.0419  0.0417
(0.966)  (0.962)  (0.992)  (0.988)
Household size (all persons)  -0.0574  ***  -0.0574 ***  -0.0574 ***  -0.0574 ***
(-15.936)  (-15.930)  (-15.916)  (-15.912)
Dependents (below 15 and over 64)  -0.0833  ***  -0.0834 ***  -0.0833 ***  -0.0833 ***
(-16.795)  (-16.809)  (-16.790)  (-16.802)
Savings in bank or access to credit (yes =  1)  0.2581 ***  0.2546 ***  0.2538 ***  0.2510 ***
(17.824)  (17.009)  (17.351)  (16.634)
Job characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Individual characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Regional dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
R'  0.497  0.497  0.497  0.497
F test  311.92  298.73  299.77  287.62
Number of observations  7796  7796  7796  7796
Notes:  Estimated  by  ordinary  least  squares,  using  White  heteroskedasticty-corrected  errors.
Figures  in parentheses  are t-statistics.  Significant  coefficients  at the  10, 5 and  1 percent
level are indicated by one, two and three asterisks  respectively.
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on LSMS data.
37Table  11
Consumption  per Capita by Employment Status
Individual Fixed Effects, 1994-1997  Panel
Dependent variable:
Explanatory variables  Log of consumption, in nuevos soles at June 1994  prices
Unemployed (yes = 1)  -0.1566***  -0.1545**  -0.1549***  -0.1452**
(-2.803)  (-2.285)  (-2.778)  (-2.150)
Unemployed x Savings or access to credit  -0.0060  -0.0273
(-0.056)  (-0.255)
Got severance (yes = 1)  0.2448 ***  0.2452 ***  0.0821  0.0828
(3.215)  (3.205)  (0.844)  (0.850)
Got severance x Savings or access to credit  0.4245 ***  0.4275 ***
(2.677)  (2.687)
Legal (yes = 1)  -0.0130  -0.0130  -0.0210  -0.0214
(-0.332)  (-0.334)  (-0.538)  (-0.547)
Legal + Contract (yes = 1)  0.0686  0.0685  0.0818  0.0814
(0.678)  (0.677)  (0.809)  (0.805)
Legal + Social security (yes = 1)  -0.0499  -0.0499  -0.0559  -0.0558
(-0.485)  (-0.485)  (-0.544)  (-0.543)
Legal + Large firm (yes = 1)  0.1384  0.1385  0.1327  0.1330
(1.440)  (1.440)  (1.384)  (1.387)
Savings  in bank or access to credit (yes =  1)  0.0771 ***  0.0775 ***  0.0650 **  0.0666 **
(2.940)  (2.861)  (2.447)  (2.438)
Year 1997 (yes = 1)  0.0682 ***  0.0682 ***  0.0686 ***  0.0686 ***
(3.892)  (3.891)  (3.923)  (3.922)
Job characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Individual characteristics  No  No  No  No
Regional dummies  No  No  No  No
Overall R2 0.039  0.039  0.037  0.037
F test  5.16  4.76  5.33  4.95
Number of observations  2726  2726  2726  2726
Notes:  Fixed-effect  estimates,  with  t-statistics  reported  in  parentheses.  There  are  two
observations  per  person.  Significant  coefficients  at  the  10,  5  and  1 percent  level  are
indicated  by one, two and three asterisks  respectively.
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on LSMS data.
38Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2602  Sugar  Policy  and  Reform  Donald  F. Larson  May  2001  P. Kokila
Brent  Borrell  33716
WPS2603  How  the Quality  of Institutions  George  R. G. Clarke  May  2001  P.  Sintim-Aboagye
Affects  Technological  Deepening  38526
in Developing  Countries
WPS2604  Eliminating  Excessive  Tariffs on  Bernard  Hoekman  May  2001  L. Tabada
Exports  of Least  Developed  Francis  Ng  36896
Countries  Marcelo  Olarreaga
WPS2605  The Macroeconomic  Impact  of Bank  Maria  Concetta  Chiuri  May  2001  E. Mekhova
Bank  Capital  Requirements  in  Giovanni  Ferri  85984
Emerging  Economies:  Past Evidence Giovanni  Majnoni
to Assess  the Future
WPS2606  Exchange  Rate  Risk  Management:  George  Allayannis  May  2001  A. Yaptenco
Evidence  from East  Asia  Gregory  W Brown  31823
Leora  F. Klapper
WPS2607  The Economical  Control  of  Mark  Gersovitz  May  2001  H. Sladovich
Infectious  Disease  Jeffrey  S. Hammer  37698
WPS2608  Financial  Development  and  Thorsten  Beck  May  2001  A. Yaptenco
International  Trade:  Is There  a Link?  38526
WPS2609 Financial  Dependence  and  Thorsten  Beck  May  2001  A. Yaptenco
International  Trade  38526
WPS2610  Crisis  and Contagion  in East  Asia:  Masahiro  Kawai  June  2001  E. Khine
Nine  Lessons  Richard  Newfarmer  37471
Sergio  Schmukler
WPS2611  Trade  and Production  Fragmentation:  Bartlojiej  Kaminski  June  2001  L. Tabada
Central  European  Economies  in  Francis  Ng  36896
European  Union  Networks  of
Production  and Marketing
WPS2612  Contractual  Savings,  Capital  Gregorio  Impavido  June  2001  P. Braxton
Markets,  and Firms'  Financing  Alberto  R. Musalem  32720
Choices  Thierry  Tressle
WPS2613  Foreign  Direct  Investment  and  Michael  Klein  June 200  Z. Fanai
Poverty Reduction  Carl  Aaron  33605
Bita  Hadjirnichael
WPS2614  South-South  Regional  Integration  Dorsati  H. Madani  June 2001  R. Simms
and Industrial  Growth:  The  Case  of  37156
the Andean  PactPolicy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2615 Trade,  Growth,  and Poverty  David  Dollar  June  2001  E. Khine
Aart  Kraay  37471
WPS2616  Reforming  Land  and  Real  Estate  Ahmed  Galal  June  2001  D. Dietrich
Markets  Omar  Razzaz  34995
WPS2617  Shanghai  Rising  in a Globalizing  Shahid  Yusuf  June  2001  S. Yusuf
World  Weiping  Wu  82339
WPS2618  Globalization  and the Challenge  Shahid  Yusuf  June 2001  S. Yusuf
for Developing  Countries  82339
WPS2619 Do Banks  Provision  for Bad Loans  Michele  Cavallo  June  2001  E. Mekhova
in Good  Times?  Empirical  Evidence  Giovanni  Majnoni  85986
and Policy  Implications
WPS2620  Who  Owns  the Media?  Simeon  Djankov  June  2001  R. Sugui
Caralee McLiesh  37951
Tatiana  Nenova
Andrei  Shleifer
WPS2621  Does  Indonesia  Have  a "Low-Pay"  Deon  Filmer  June  2001  H. Sladovich
Civil Service?  David  L. Lindauer  37698
WPS2622  Community  Programs  and  Women's  David  Coady  June  2001  L.  Wang
Participation:  The  Chinese  Experience  Xinyi  Dai  37596
Limin  Wang
WPS  2623  Trade  Liberalization  in China's  Elena lanchovichina  June  2001  L. Tabada
Accession  to the World  Trade  Will Martin  36896
Organization
WPS2624  Are Incentives  Everything?  Payment  Varun  Gauri  June  2001  H. Sladovich
Mechanisms  for Health  Care  Providers  37698
in Developing  Countries
WPS2625  Australia's  Experience  with Local  Garry Pursell  June  2001  L.  Tabada
Content  Programs  in the Auto Industry:  36896
Lessons  for India  and  Other  Developing
Countries